ABSTRACT
Introduction
Japan faces an unprecedented situation concerning energy policy. After the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) and consequent Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in March 2011, Japan's nuclear power plants have barely operated over several years, resulting in Japan becoming increasingly dependent on fossil fuel imports, especially liquid natural gas (LNG), for electricity generation, a development coinciding with the significant depreciation of the yen (see, e.g., METI, 2014b METI, , 2015 . The Japanese government has sought to promote renewable energy production after the incident at Fukushima, using measures such as a feed-in-tariff (FIT) scheme. Recently, this policy is starting to garner much attention regarding the possibility of a heavy burden on the shoulders of households in the near future (e.g., METI, 2016) . 1 Adding to this movement toward 'denuclearization', the government introduced a new tax on fossil fuels to address climate change, and raised Japan's consumption tax to better sustain the existing social security system. Combined, these developments have significantly increased energy costs in Japan, and, eventually, they will further increase the burden placed on households for energy use, despite recent falls in international energy prices.
Apart from these problems regarding energy costs, there is a compounding problem. The share of low-income households in Japan is steadily increasing because of population aging and its continuing sluggish economy (see, e.g., MHLW, 2012a MHLW, , 2012b . Vulnerable households, e.g., single-parent-with-dependent-child(ren), elderly, and single-person households, are much more sensitive to rising living costs, including energy (Boardman, 2010; Hills, 2012) . From this point of view, the problem of energy poverty -the theme of this study-could be a worrisome concern for Japan on a middle-to long-term basis. As discussed later, energy poverty means the condition of not being able to meet basic energy needs.
Against this background, this paper provides a historical analysis of the situation of energy poverty in Japan after the 2000s, especially around the time of the GEJE and the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, and specifies the factors accounting for the increase in energy poverty in Japan in that period. Since there are few studies concerning the matter in Japan, this is the first to show empirically the certainty of energy poverty in Japan after the 2000s, using detailed microdata, particularly among lower-income and vulnerable households. To achieve that end, the paper employs vulnerability and poverty measures, and a new decomposition technique using our unique dataset.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of energy poverty. Section 3 explains the data used in the analysis.
Section 4 discusses the results. The final section provides some concluding remarks.
Measuring energy poverty
Energy (or fuel) poverty, which is the main subject of this analysis, can be defined conceptually as the condition of lacking the resources necessary to meet basic energy needs, following the definition of food poverty given by Greer and Thorbecke (1986) .
2 Bouzarovski et al. (2012) provide a similar definition in which energy poverty describes a condition wherein a household cannot access energy services at the home up to a socially and materially necessitated level. The ways of thinking about energy poverty can be split usually into one of two types.
The first is 'availability', concerning the lack of access to modern types of energy (e.g., electricity), which is generally the focal point in a developing country context (e.g., IEA, 2010). The second is 'affordability', comprising various issues that prevent people from satisfying their basic energy needs. This is the typical focus of the energy poverty problem in developed countries like Japan. As for income poverty, the issue of energy poverty in developed countries has a 'relative' nature while that in developing countries has an 'absolute' nature (see, e.g., Kakwani and Silber, 2007) . Even in developed countries, the problem of energy poverty can be a major social issue that potentially affects millions of households and individuals, and may account for significant hardships, negative health impacts, and additional carbon emissions (Hills, 2011 (Hills, , 2012 .
To date, there has been rather less attention given to the energy poverty problem in developed countries than in developing countries (Boardman, 2010; Bouzarovski et al., 2012; Brunner et al., 2012) . However, since Boardman's (1991) seminal work, the UK context has become the exception. Besides regular annual reports, there have been several reports on the issue of energy poverty by the UK government, among others. Of special note, the Hills fuel poverty review suggested a new approach to evaluating energy poverty (Hills, 2011 (Hills, , 2012 .
Subsequently, there is a recently growing literature on energy poverty in the UK, such as Boardman (2010), Chawla and Pollitt (2013) , Moore (2012) , and
Waddams Price et al. (2012) , on other European Union (EU) countries such as Austria (Brunner et al., 2012) , Germany (Heindl and Schuessler, 2015; Schuessler, 2014) , and Spain (Phimister et al., 2015) , and as a comparative study across the EU (Bouzarovski et al., 2012; Thomson and Snell, 2013 ).
On poverty measurement, evaluating poverty comprises these two steps (Sen, 1976 (Sen, , 1979 . The first step is 'identification'-that is, who are the poor?-and the second step is 'aggregation'-how are the poverty characteristics of different people to be combined into an aggregate measure? Identification involves the practical definition of certain given standards-the poverty line-that might separate 'the poor' from 'those that are not poor'.
Setting the poverty line is a troublesome but necessary task. In terms of energy poverty, energy budget shares often serve as standards (see, e.g., Pachauri et al., 2004) . Boardman (1991) In terms of 'aggregation', this 10% indicator is a kind of headcount ratio, which identifies the extent of poverty in a society using the proportion of the 'poor' in the total population. The headcount ratio is popular and widely used as an income poverty measure. 4 We employ a variant of this measure in our analysis for generality and simplicity, as discussed later in detail.
3 Along with this definition, the UK government uses an alternative definition being the Low Income High Cost (LIHC) indicator. See, e.g., Hills (2012) for details. The LIHC indicator is nevertheless being criticized by some researchers. For example, Heindl and Schuessler (2015) prove that the LIHC indicator has counter-intuitive dynamic properties, which may cause false policy implications. 4 That said, the headcount ratio has some well-known problems. One is that it pays no attention to the 'depth' of poverty and thus evaluates the marginally poor the same as the miserably poor.
These drawbacks also generally apply to the 10% indicator. For more general information on poverty measures, see Sen (1997) and Haughton and Khandker (2009) .
Energy poverty and general income poverty are closely related; hence, researchers have often not treated energy poverty as an independent problem.
However, there is good reason to do so. In the field of poverty measurement, there is a broad consensus that deprivation is multidimensional and therefore looking only at income poverty is insufficient (Atkinson, 2003; Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003) . The concept of energy poverty perceives poverty not just as the lowness of income, but also as the inability to meet some elementary and essential needs (Sen, 1997) . 5 Maintaining an adequate level of warmth at home is a clear example of such basic needs. Many studies empirically show that energy poverty is a distinct problem not subsumed into general income poverty (see, e.g., Pachauri et al., 2004; Hills, 2011 Hills, , 2012 Phimister et al., 2015) . For this reason, Boardman (2010, p. 21) appropriately declares that currently, 'fuel poverty is politically accepted as a real problem'.
Data
We measure energy poverty in Japan using the unique microdata on household income, expenditure, and characteristics in a sample of about 50,000
households covering all of Japan. The dataset is created by my own work using Expenditure, provided by the National Statistics Center for this research purpose.
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The dataset enables us to perform a complete analysis of energy poverty by focusing on detailed household characteristics.
For the purpose of the analysis, we need to perform two types of modification. The first data modification is seasonal adjustment (see the Appendix for details). As discussed, the anonymized microdata are made from the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure, with expenditure data collected in autumn (from September to November for two-or-more-person households and from October to November for one-person households). 7 Energy poverty is a problem aggravated in winter, above all in January, the coldest month in Japan.
Hence, we construct seasonally adjusted expenditure data using another government household survey, the Family Income and Expenditure Survey. This survey has a much smaller sample, but the data are monthly, using the same definition. We construct seasonally adjusted data on household expenses for energy goods ('electricity', 'gas', and 'other fuels'), using monthly figures and 2013 such as: two-or-more-person households and 3,936 one-person households) from all of Japan. The household data are fully anonymous and there is no detailed information about the place of residence. Each household has a sampling weight designed to replicate the whole population of Japan. We use these weights in all our calculations to obtain unbiased estimates of the energy poverty rate in Japan.
Results
We consider energy poverty in Japan during the past few decades and evaluate the factors that drive any changes in energy poverty. We particularly focus on any change in energy poverty in the period before and after 2011, the year of the GEJE and the Fukushima nuclear plant accident.
Overview
We first summarize Japan's situation. Fig. 1 depicts the change in domestic energy prices (as measured by the energy consumer price index, the energy CPI) in Japan after the 2000s. 9 Here, 'energy price' is a composite index of electricity, gas, and other fuels (kerosene) prices using the 2010 official weights. As shown, the energy price progressively increases after the 2000s in Japan, although we can readily identify a strong increase after 2011. As discussed, almost all nuclear power plants in Japan shut down after 2011 and Japan has become more dependent on fossil fuel imports, a problem compounded by higher international energy prices and a weaker yen after 2011 (see, e.g., METI, 2014b, 2015 for details). Although the energy price has fallen in 2015 reflecting the plunge in international energy prices, it is notable that the price is still higher than the level of 2013. provide a well-known definition of vulnerability: vulnerability is the degree to which a (natural or human) system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, and vulnerability is a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. Here, referring to this definition, we construct a simple and convenient 'vulnerability index' for energy poverty; that is, the ratio of the energy CPI to household income, as plotted in Fig. 3 . 11 Here, the change in energy CPI represents the degree of exposure, which drives the increase in energy cost, whereas the change in household income reflects the extent of adaptive capacity to manage the increase in energy cost. 12 The index clearly shows that the level of vulnerability gradually increases, despite minor fluctuations, after the 2000s. It is also noteworthy that there is a sharp upturn in our vulnerability measure after the GEJE, reflecting the dramatic increase in energy prices following the incident at Fukushima. In 2015, the index decreases due to the recent fall in energy prices, though the level of vulnerability is still high, exceeding the level in 2013. [Please insert Fig. 3 here] 
Energy poverty in Japan
In this subsection, we evaluate energy poverty in Japan in detail using our unique microdata, as an extension of the aggregate analysis in the previous subsection. To measure energy poverty, we employ the approach of energy budget shares discussed earlier. Following the conventional definition, a household is in energy poverty if it spends over 10% of its income on energy expenses (costs) (Boardman, 1991 (Boardman, , 2010 DECC, 2010; Heindl and Schuessler, 2015; Pachauri et al., 2004; Phimister et al., 2015; Schuessler, 2014) . More concretely, our definition (hereafter the 10% measure) is a variant of the headcount ratio index P, in which the terms are the energy cost-income ratios of households (E i /Y i ) and the poverty line (z) equals 0.1. households. These households are quite important in the context of energy poverty. Hence, total income is used for calculation in the analysis. Due to this treatment, the result of the paper might underestimate the situation of energy poverty in Japan. However, there is not so much difference between before-and after-tax incomes especially for the lowest income deciles, which are among the focal points of this study.
includes the three types of energy consumption (in values) for 'electricity', 'gas', and 'other fuels' (kerosene) as explained in the last section. The definition follows Boardman (1991 Boardman ( , 2010 and is similar to the UK government measure (DECC, 2010), although it should be noted that energy costs in this paper are actual expenses based on the microdata, rather than the hypothesized values calculated by the model. We measure the energy poverty rates in the year of 2004, 2007, 2010 , and 2013, respectively, using the index P. It is noteworthy that all the energy poverty rates in the following analysis employ the 'replicating' weights for obtaining unbiased results.
The Hills fuel poverty review identifies some drawbacks associated with this form of the 10% measure (Hills, 2011 (Hills, , 2012 . It is possible that we could mistakenly identify richer households that are merely overconsuming energy goods as energy poor. To overcome this issue, we carefully examine the energy poverty by income decile and only focus on the lower income decile group using this 10% measure. 
Decomposition analysis
The analysis in this paper clearly illustrates a continuous increase in energy poverty rates in Japan between 2004 and 2013. In this subsection, we attempt to identify the factors that drove the changes in energy poverty in Japan using a new approach to the decomposition of poverty indices, being a simple decomposition using the Shapley decomposition technique, as developed by Shorrocks (2013) .
The Shapley decomposition yields an exact (complete) decomposition and produces no residual terms, unlike conventional decomposition procedures with significant residuals. 18 Without residual or interaction terms, the Shapley technique can totally and comprehensively disentangle the change in energy poverty rates into the contributions of the several explanatory factors.
sample of 15,782 households from the whole of Japan and a response rate of 68.2%.
Assume an index I whose value is determined by a set of m factors, X k
where f( ) is the underlying functional relationship. In the context of energy poverty, the important factors fall into two categories: energy cost and income.
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As an index for measuring energy poverty, we use:
where P is an energy poverty index (the 10% measure in this paper), E is energy cost, Y is income, and z is the poverty threshold. In the 10% measure case, z is constant at 0.1; therefore, we need not consider this further for decomposition.
We apply the Shapley decomposition to the change in the energy poverty index, i.e., the 10% measure, and exactly decompose the additive change in the energy poverty index between the initial (t-1) and terminal (t) periods using:
(Contribution of 'energy cost')
(Contribution of 'income') (4.4)
As shown in the equation, the Shapley decomposition regards the contribution of each explanatory factor as the average of m! estimated contributions over all the possible elimination sequences (see Shorrocks (2013) for details). Here, the Shapley technique quantifies the contribution of 'energy cost' as the average impact of the change in energy cost from the initial to the terminal period (from E t-1 to E t ) using the initial Y t-1 and terminal Y t period weights, and the contribution of 'income' as the average impact of the income change from Y t-1 to Y t using the E t-1 and E t weights.
In the equation, the left-hand side of the equality is the additive change in the energy poverty index between the initial and terminal periods using the 10% measure. The first half of the right-hand side of the equality is the contribution of energy cost to the change in energy poverty rates between the periods, whereas the second half is the contribution of income. Therefore, the Shapley technique perfectly decomposes the change in energy poverty into two parts: one part attributable to energy costs and the other part attributable to income.
We further decompose the change in the energy poverty rates between the periods 2004, 2010, and 2013, and focus on the changes for the lower-income deciles and vulnerable households (mother-child and single-aged). Table 1 provides the decomposition results. As shown, both energy cost and income positively contribute to the increase in energy poverty from 2004 to 2010; the period before the GEJE. It is notable that the contribution of lowering income stands out, rather than that of energy cost hike. On the other hand, from 2010 to 2013, immediately before and after the GEJE, income becomes the alleviating factor and energy cost is the principal factor driving the increase in energy poverty. After the Fukushima accident, the increase of energy cost becomes the primary driving force of energy poverty in Japan. The results clearly show there were major changes in these driving factors before and after the GEJE and the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident. Table 1 Decomposition of the change in the energy poverty index.
[Please insert Table 1 here]
Energy efficiency
Finally, we consider the impact of energy efficiency improvement on energy poverty. Energy efficiency improvements, e.g., by energy-saving investments, would generally cause lower energy costs of households, which reduces energy poverty (Hills, 2012) . 20 Notably, the contribution of energy cost in the above decomposition analysis includes that effect of energy efficiency. Nonetheless, it is considered that households in energy poverty can little afford to make energy-saving investments on their own and can benefit little from the effect of energy efficiency improvements (Boardman, 2010) .
In the context of energy poverty, previous studies yield ample evidence of the importance of energy efficiency of housing (e.g., Boardman, 1991 Boardman, , 2010 Hills, 22 2012 (METI, 2011) . Against this backgrounds, it is of primary importance to strengthen measures for promoting energy-saving investments specifically targeting energy-poor households (see, e.g., Boardman, 2010; Brunner et al., 2012) . Of late, we could expect that the downturn in international energy prices could ease energy poverty in Japan to some extent. Restarting some nuclear power plants after 2015 could also help push electricity prices down. These might alleviate the difficulties of lower-income and vulnerable households regarding energy costs. However, the persistent sluggish economy, the substantially continuing nuclear power plant shutdown, the possible upturn of international energy prices, the weaker yen, and the need for higher carbon pricing to meet the Paris agreement's target, etc., offset such straightforward optimism (see, e.g., Suzuki et al., 2016) . Furthermore, there is a rising chorus of concern about the FIT scheme in Japan; for example, METI (2016) estimates the burden placed by FIT on the population to amount to 1.8 trillion yen in the fiscal year 2016. This echoes the result of this paper, i.e., that more than one in seven vulnerable households were energy poor in Japan even in 2004-before the Great Surge in international energy prices.
Considering such a background, in some cases, the government may need to consider countermeasures to address energy poverty, such as social tariffs, from the perspective of poverty and redistribution. 22 Above all, the government should introduce effective measures for promoting energy-saving investments, especially for housing, that particularly target low-income and vulnerable households (see, e.g., Boardman, 2010; Brunner et al., 2012) .
Additional research is necessary, especially on the definition of energy poverty. Going back to the root of the definition, Boardman (1991) focuses on three factors-energy price, low income, and energy efficiency (of the house)-in considering energy poverty in developed countries. Hills (2011 Hills ( , 2012 ) also stresses fuel prices, low income, and energy efficiency as the three main drivers of energy poverty. These seminal studies show that the nature of energy poverty is a kind of multidimensional poverty. With this in mind, we need to reconsider the measurement of energy poverty from a multidimensional poverty viewpoint other than a unidimensional one (see, e.g., Kakwani and Silber, 2007) .
This paper empirically presents the situation of energy poverty in Japan after the 2000s for the first time. We trust that the findings will produce important implications for future practices in tackling the problem of energy poverty in Japan and in other developed countries.
problem is that the tariffs were offered by energy utilities, not the government, and their costs financed by energy bills, with the recent literature recommending costs be borne by taxes (e.g., Boardman, 2010; Chawla and Pollitt, 2013) . 
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Appendix: Seasonality
This Appendix illustrates the energy poverty rates in three cases of different seasonal adjustment. The first case is no seasonal adjustment (the original figures, being the average from September to November); the second is the case of seasonal adjustment to the annual average (the average from January to December)-the main result in this study; the third is of seasonal adjustment to the winter average (the average from January to March). 23 This result illustrates the robustness of the implication of this paper to the seasonal-adjustment procedure, which we generally confirm. However, the result indicates the energy poverty rates in winter are quite high. It points out that we need to pay more attention when we evaluate the levels of figures that have a marked seasonality factor, such as energy poverty. 23 Winter in Japan is December, January, and February. However, fuel bills usually lag usage by a month, so January to March are the peak fuel billing periods during the year in Japan. Table 1 Decomposition of the change in the energy poverty index. 2004-2013 2004-2010 2010-2013 
